

Quantum algorithms: Shor's integer factoring classical and quantum parts

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Quantum Repeaters for entanglement

Quantum Cryptography & Security

Uses of entanglement

↳ QKD

→ Q bit commitment.

↳ Dense Coding

↳ Teleportation


Quantum factory

Alice. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Yes} = |++\rangle, |--\rangle, |+-\rangle, |-+\rangle \dots \\ \text{No} = |0\rangle, |1\rangle, |1\rangle, |0\rangle \dots \end{array} \right.$

Q Repeaters for Entanglement

Relay A
suffers Z errors

Relay B
suffers X errors



$$|+-> \otimes |00> = |0000> + |0100> + |1000> + |1100>$$

↓ cnots

$$|0000> + |0101> + |1010> + |1111> = |\bar{+}0>$$

↓ relabel.

$$|0000> + |1001> + |0110> + |1111> = \overline{|00> + |11>}$$

↓ cnots.

$$|0000> + |1011> + |0111> + |1100>$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{"} \\ & (|00> + |11>) \otimes |00> + (|01 + |10>) \otimes |11> \\ & = \end{aligned}$$

Quantum implications on security

	Attacks	Defenses
Classical		Post Quantum Crypto.
Quantum	Shor algo attack asym key crypto	QKD, sym key crypto

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The factoring problem

One way functions for cryptography

1. Multiplying two b -bit numbers: on order of b^2 time.
2. Best known classical algorithm to factor a b -bit number: on order of about $2^{\sqrt[3]{b}}$ time.
 - ▶ Makes multiplying large primes a candidate one-way function.
 - ▶ It's an open question of mathematics to prove whether one way functions exist.

Public key cryptography

Numberphile YouTube channel explanation of RSA public key cryptography:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M7kEpw1tn50>

The factoring problem

One way functions for cryptography

1. Multiplying two b -bit numbers: on order of b^2 time.
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Quantum integer factoring algorithm

- ▶ Quantum algorithm to factor a b -bit number: b^3 .
- ▶ Peter Shor, 1994.
- ▶ Important example of quantum algorithm offering exponential speedup.

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The classical part: converting factoring to order finding / period finding

General strategy for the classical part

1. Factoring
2. Modular square root
3. Discrete logarithm
4. Order finding
5. Period finding

The fact that a quantum algorithm can support all these primitives leads to additional ways that future quantum computing can be useful / threatening to existing cryptography.

Factoring

$$N = pq$$

$$N = 15 = 3 \times 5$$

Modular square root

Finding the modular square root

$$s^2 \pmod N = 1$$

$$s = \sqrt{1} \pmod N$$

Trivial roots would be $s = \pm 1$.

- ▶ Are there other (nontrivial) square roots?
- ▶ For $N = 15$, $s = \pm 4$, $s = \pm 11$, $s = \pm 14$ are all nontrivial square roots. (Show this).
- ▶ Later in these slides, we will see how nontrivial square roots are useful for factoring.

Discrete log

1. Pick a that is relatively prime with N .
2. Efficient to test if relatively prime by finding GCD using Euclid's algorithm.
For example, $a=6$ and $n=15$.

Exercise: list the possible a 's for $N = 15$.

Discrete log

1. Pick a that is relatively prime with N .
2. Efficient to test if relatively prime by finding GCD using Euclid's algorithm.
For example, $a = 6$ and $n = 15$.

So now our factoring problem is:

$$a^r \pmod{N} = 1$$

$$a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$$

In fact, this algorithm for finding discrete log even more directly attacks other crypto primitives such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Order finding

Our discrete log problem is equivalent to order finding.

	$a^1 \pmod{15}$	$a^2 \pmod{15}$	$a^3 \pmod{15}$	$a^4 \pmod{15}$
a=2	2	4	8	1
a=4	4	1	4	1
a=7	7	4	13	1
a=8	8	4	2	1
a=11	11	1	11	1
a=13	13	4	7	1
a=14	14	1	14	1

Find smallest r such that $a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$

Period finding

In other words, the problem by now can also be phrased as finding the period of a function.

$$f(x) = f(x + r)$$

Where

$$f(x) = a^x = a^{x+r} \pmod{N}$$

Find r .

What to do after quantum algorithm gives you r

- ▶ If r is odd or if $a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$, abandon.
- ▶ There is separate theorem saying no more than a quarter of trials would have to be tossed.

Exercise: try for $a = 14$.

What to do after quantum algorithm gives you r

- ▶ If r is odd or if $a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$, abandon.
- ▶ There is separate theorem saying no more than a quarter of trials would have to be tossed.

Exercise: try for $a = 14$.

Otherwise, factors are $\text{GCD}(a^{\frac{r}{2}} \pm 1, N)$

$a=2$	$r=4$	$2^2 \pm 1 = 4 \pm 1$	
$a=4$	$r=2$	$4^1 \pm 1 = 4 \pm 1$	
$a=7$	$r=4$	$7^2 \pm 1 = 49 \pm 1$	
$a=8$	$r=4$	$8^2 \pm 1 = 64 \pm 1$	
$a=11$	$r=2$	$11^1 \pm 1 = 11 \pm 1$	
$a=13$	$r=4$	$13^2 \pm 1 = 169 \pm 1$	
$a=14$	$r=2$	$14^2 \pm 1 = 196 \pm 1$	(bad case)

Notice why we discarded 14.

Proof why this works and why factoring is modular square root

$$a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$$

So now $a^{\frac{r}{2}}$ is a nontrivial square root of 1 mod N.

$$a^r - 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$$

$$(a^{\frac{r}{2}} - 1)(a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$$

The above implies that

$$\frac{(a^{\frac{r}{2}} - 1)(a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1)}{N}$$

is an integer. So now we have to prove that

1. $\frac{a^{\frac{r}{2}} - 1}{N}$ is not an integer, and
2. $\frac{a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1}{N}$ is not an integer.

Proof why this works and why factoring is modular square root

Suppose $\frac{a^{\frac{r}{2}}-1}{N}$ is an integer

that would imply

$$a^{\frac{r}{2}} - 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$$

$$a^{\frac{r}{2}} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$$

but we already defined r is the smallest such that $a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$, so there is a contradiction, so $\frac{a^{\frac{r}{2}}-1}{N}$ is not an integer.

Suppose $\frac{a^{\frac{r}{2}}+1}{N}$ is an integer

that would imply

$$a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$$

but we already eliminated such cases because we know this doesn't give us a useful result.

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
How to construct the Quantum Fourier transform

Evaluation of Shor's as a fault-tolerant quantum algorithm

The quantum part: period finding using quantum Fourier transform

- ▶ After picking a value for a , use quantum parallelism to calculate modular exponentiation: $a^x \pmod N$ for all $0 \leq x \leq 2^n - 1$ simultaneously.
- ▶ Use interference to find a global property, such as the period r .

Calculate modular exponentiation



- ▶ Image source: Huang and Martonosi, Statistical assertions for validating patterns and finding bugs in quantum programs, 2019.
- ▶ A good source on how to build the controlled adder, controlled multiplier, and controlled exponentiation is in Beauregard, Circuit for Shor’s algorithm using $2n+3$ qubits, 2002.

Calculate modular exponentiation

- ▶ State after applying modular exponentiation circuit is

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x=0}^{2^n-1} |x\rangle |f(x)\rangle$$

- ▶ Concretely, using our running example of $N = 15$, need $n = 4$ qubits to encode, and suppose we picked $a = 2$, the state would be

$$\frac{1}{4} \sum_{x=0}^{15} |x\rangle |2^x \pmod{15}\rangle$$

Measurement of target (bottom, ancillary) qubit register

- ▶ We then measure the target qubit register, collapsing it to a definite value. The state of the upper register would then be limited to:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{A}} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} |x_0 + ar\rangle$$

- ▶ Concretely, using our running example of $N = 15$, and suppose we picked $a = 2$, and suppose measurement results in 2, the upper register would be a uniform superposition of all $|x\rangle$ such that $2^x \equiv 2 \pmod{15}$:

$$\frac{|1\rangle}{2} + \frac{|5\rangle}{2} + \frac{|9\rangle}{2} + \frac{|13\rangle}{2}$$

- ▶ The key trick now is can we extract the period $r = 4$ from such a quantum state. We do this using the quantum Fourier transform.

Quantum Fourier transform to obtain period

The task now is to use Fourier transform to obtain the period.

$$QFT(|x\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{y=0}^{2^n-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} xy} |y\rangle$$

$$QFT = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & \omega & \omega^2 & \dots & \omega^{2^n-1} \\ 1 & \omega^2 & \omega^4 & \dots & \omega^{2(2^n-1)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega^{2^n-1} & \omega^{2(2^n-1)} & \dots & \omega^{(2^n-1)(2^n-1)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Where

$$\omega = e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n}}$$

And recall that

$$e^{ix} = \cos x + i \sin x$$

Quantum Fourier transform to obtain period

The task now is to use Fourier transform to obtain the period.

$$QFT(|x\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{y=0}^{2^n-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} xy} |y\rangle$$

$$\begin{aligned} & QFT\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{A}} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} |x_0 + ar\rangle\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{y=0}^{2^n-1} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{A}} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} (x_0+ar)y}\right) |y\rangle \\ &= \sum_{y=0}^{2^n-1} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n A}} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} x_0 y} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} ar y}\right) |y\rangle \end{aligned}$$

Quantum Fourier transform to obtain period

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prob}(y) &= \frac{A}{2^n} \left| \frac{1}{A} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} x_0 y} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} a r y} \right|^2 \\ &= \frac{A}{2^n} \left| \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{2^n} a r y} \right|^2\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Here, values of y such that $\frac{r y}{2^n}$ is close to an integer will have maximal measurement probability.
- ▶ In our case, only $\frac{r y}{2^n} = \frac{4 \cdot 4}{16}$, $|y\rangle = |4\rangle$ will have high measurement probability.
- ▶ To get a beautiful explanation of principle of least action, read Feynman, QED.

How to construct the Quantum Fourier transform




Figure: Credit: Wikimedia

How to construct the Quantum Fourier transform

$$R_k = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \exp \frac{2\pi i}{2^k} \end{bmatrix}$$

- ▶ Cost of computing the FFT for functions encoded in n bits: $O(2^n n)$
- ▶ Cost of quantum Fourier transform for functions encoded in n qubits: $O(n^2)$ gates.

1.

$$R_0 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \exp \frac{2\pi i}{2^0} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} = I$$

2.

$$R_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \exp \frac{2\pi i}{2^1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix} = Z$$

3.

$$R_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \exp \frac{2\pi i}{2^2} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & i \end{bmatrix} = S$$

4.

$$R_3 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \exp \frac{2\pi i}{2^3} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}i}{2} \end{bmatrix} = T$$

Time cost and implementation

Factoring underpins cryptosystems.

For number represented as b bits:

- ▶ Classical algorithm: needs $O(2^{\sqrt[3]{b}})$ operations. Factoring 512-bit integer: 8400 years. 1024-bit integer: 13×10^{12} years.
- ▶ Quantum algorithm: needs $O(b^2 \log(b))$ operations. Factoring 512-bit integer: 3.5 hours. 1024-bit integer: 31 hours.

Source: Oskin et al. A Practical Architecture for Reliable Quantum Computers.

Time cost and implementation

Figure 1. Scaling the classical number field sieve (NFS) vs. Shor's quantum algorithm for factoring.³⁷

The horizontal axis is the length of the number to be factored. The steep curve is NFS, with the marked point at $L = 768$ requiring 3,300 CPU-years. The vertical line at $L = 2048$ is NIST's 2007 recommendation for RSA key length for data intended to remain secure until 2030. The other lines are various combinations of quantum computer logical clock speed for a three-qubit operation known as a Toffoli gate (1Hz and 1MHz), method of implementing the arithmetic portion of Shor's algorithm (BCDP, D, and F), and quantum computer architecture (NTC and AC, with the primary difference being whether or not long-distance operations are supported). The assumed capacity of a machine in this graph is $2L^2$ logical qubits. This figure illustrates the difficulty of making pronouncements about the speed of quantum computers.




Figure: Credit: Van Meter and Horsman. A Blueprint for Building a Quantum Computer. Communications of the ACM. 2013.

Near-term and far-future quantum computing




Figure: Credit: Maslov, Nam, and Kim. An Outlook for Quantum Computing. Proceedings of the IEEE. 2019.

Fig. 2. Performance space of quantum computers, measured by the error probability of each entangling gate in the horizontal axis (roughly inversely proportional to the total number of gates that can be executed on a NISQ machine), and the number of qubits in the system in the vertical axis. Blue dotted line approximately demarcates quantum systems that can be simulated using best classical computers, while the green colored region shows where the existing quantum computing systems with verified performance numbers lie (as of September 2018). Purple shaded region indicates computational tasks that accomplish the so-called “quantum supremacy,” where the computation carried out by the quantum computer defies classical simulation regardless of its usefulness. The different shapes illustrate resource counts for solving various problems, with solid symbols corresponding to the exact entangling gate counts and number of qubits in NISQ machines, and shaded regions showing approximate gate error requirements and number of qubits for an FT implementation (not pictured are the regions where the error gets too close to the known fault-tolerance thresholds): cyan diamond and shaded region correspond to factoring a 1024-bit number using Shor’s algorithm [14], magenta circle and shaded region represent simulation of a 72-spin Heisenberg model [20], and orange shaded region illustrates NF simulation [21].

Steps toward useful quantum computing




Figure: Credit: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects. 2019.